Abstruct-This paper presents an annotated transcript of an interview where a decision analyst elicited a judgmental probability distribution from a senior executive of a technologybased corporation. This case study illustrates the issues involved in interactions between analysts and managers. Judgmentally assessed probabilities are often used in situations with uncertainty where historical data does not provide a direct basis for determining Probabilities. Thus, the interview is of direct interest to analysts and managers who must address situations with significant uncertainty. The paper also presents a new way of capturing information about how experts practice their expertise, A procedure involving videotaping and post-production processing was used by the decision analyst to reconstruct his thought processes during the interview. This approach shows promise of providing an effective way of capturing expertise for the development of computer-based expert systems.
I. INTRODUCTION HIS paper presents a case history which illustrates the
T issues involved in interactions between analysts and managers, as well as the types of decisions which an analyst must make while interacting with a technically trained manager. Specifically, an annotated transcript is presented for a session where an experienced decision analyst elicited a judgmental (subjective) probability distribution from a senior aerospace executive. The theoretical basis for judgmental probabilities is well established [ I 11 , and they are an important part of decision and risk analyses where probabilities cannot be determined from historical data. Research on judgmental probability elicitation has identified several shortcomings in unaided elicitation of probabilities [l] , [6) , and formal protocols have been developed to address these difficulties [7] , [8], [14] . These protocols specify a rigorous process which systematically addresses the various reasoning difficulties using a detailed elicitation process.
In practice, an analyst must balance the need for careful and detailed elicitation of probabilities against other requirements in the analysis process. Many real-world analyses are conducted under (often severe) time and resource constraints. Several probability distributions may be needed for an analysis, and the analyst must consider the total available time and budget for all the elicitations (as well as other parts of the analysis) when deciding how much effort to apply to determining each distribution. In addition, the analyst must judge the tolerance of a particular manager for participating in a detailed elicitation-it may be better to obtain a small amount of information about the probability distribution rather than persevere with a formal protocol until the manager is no longer willing to participate.
In other words, managing the probability elicitation process requires that the analyst make frudeqffs among a variety of objectives that are important to completing a decision or risk analysis in a timely manner within a reasonable budget. Learning to make such tradeoffs, which are common to many analysdmanager interactions, is an important part of becoming a good analyst. Generally, the process of managing analyst/ manager interactions is learned "on the job" by analysts during "real" elicitation interviews. The analyst must learn to take into account not only manager verbal statements but nonverbal cueing as well. This paper contributes to the learning process by documenting an actual elicitation session between an experienced decision analyst and a manager. The session is annotated to show, more completely, the thought process of the analyst while managing the process, and these annotations illustrate both the elicitation protocol and interview management issues that an analyst must address while interacting with a manager.
JUDGMENTAL PROBABILITY ELICITATION PROTOCOL
Research has demonstrated that people do a poor job of unaided reasoning about situations where there is uncertainty. Howard [5] quotes Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein:
"The major advance in descriptive research [about reasoning under uncertainty] . . . has been the discovery that people systematically violate the principles of rational decisionmaking when judging probabilities, making predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks. Biases in judgments of uncertain events are often large and difficult to eliminate. The source of these biases can be traced to various heuristics or mental strategies that people use to process information . . . In the final discussion, a strong case is made that judgmental biases affect important decisions in the real world; numerous examples are provided." References [ l ] and [6] summarize the research findings on this subject. While research has demonstrated that people have difficulty informally determining judgmental probabilities, this research has also shown that properly structured elicitation protocols can substantially improve the quality of judgmentally assessed probability distributions.
When eliciting judgmental probabilities, the cumulative distribution function [ 2 ] is usually the most convenient summary of the probability distribution for a continuous uncertain quantity (random variable). Several fractiles of the probability distribution are elicited from the subject, and the remainder of the cumulative distribution function is estimated, either by drawing the curve in by hand or by more formal curve fitting techniques. 6 is 44. Thus, there is a 0.50 probability that the actual value of the uncertain quantity will be less than or equal to 44.) Merkhofer [8] presents a protocol for judgmentally determining a cumulative distribution function for a continuous uncertain quantity, and this protocol was used in the probability elicitation which is presented below. The protocol includes five elicitation stages, followed by two analysis stages which are not discussed here. The five elicitation stages are 1) motivating, 2) structuring, 3) conditioning, 4) encoding, and 5 ) verifying. This stage determines whether there is motivation for the subject to either consciously or unconsciously adjust hisher probability assignments. That is, is there something in the reward structure facing the subject which could influence his or her probability elicitations? The two primary possibilities are "management bias" ("If that's what they want minimized, then we'll minimize it.") and "expert bias" ("I'm the expert on this, so I'm not supposed to be uncertain about it.").
Stage 2: Structuring: During this stage, the uncertain quantity to be considered is exactly specified, and an appropriate measurement scale is determined. A useful method for determining whether an uncertain quantity is clearly defined is the "clairvoyance test." The measurement scale should be such that a clairvoyant who can foresee the future could tell what the value of the uncertain quantity will tum out to be. That is, the clairvoyant could specify a single number for the uncertain quantity without requiring clarification of the measurement scale definition.
Information which is relevant to estimating uncertainties is discussed. The analyst pays particular attention to combating the anchoring and adjustment bias which can lead to overconfidence [l], [6] .
Stage 4: Encoding: The actual elicitation of the probability distribution for the uncertain quantity.
Stage 5: Verihing: Making sure, upon review, that the subject still stands behind the elicited probabilities. If not, additional elicitation is required.
Stage 3: Conditioning:
111. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE The probability elicitation interview presented here was conducted as part of research [12] investigating the feasibility of guiding experts to self-elicit their own knowledge or expertise. This research tested the hypothesis that this approach would more accurately determine the expert's knowledge than is possible with other approaches commonly used in knowledge acquisition for expert systems. One of the authors (Kirkwood), a decision analyst with two decades of experience conducting probability elicitations, led a judgmental probability elicitation interview with a senior executive of a large aerospace company. The participating executive had major planning responsibilities for his corporation. His educational background is in industrial engineering with training in probability theory, and he has also taught the subject.
The research employed videotape recording and postproduction processing as a basis for investigating the probability elicitation process used by the decision analyst. The methodology, called Guided Self-Elicitation, is based on the cognitive information processing model of Gilmartin, Newell, and Simon [4] which is shown in Fig. 1 . As this figure shows, aural and visual information flows to the expert through a recognition buffer and into short term memory (STM). As this perceptual information enters short term memory, it is "chunked" into discrete units, which stimulate mental processing. Due to the pass-through nature of short term memory [9] , some information is lost before it is transferred to long term memory (LTM). The process of retention and loss is guided in part by mental processing strategies which are held in long term memory. An expert (the decision analyst in this case study) has presumably developed good strategies to guide the mental processing.
The Guided Self-Elicitation process requires the expert to perform a task during which recordings are made of the aural and visual information which is flowing to the expert. During a later review of these recordings, the expert articulates his or her thought processing during the task in order to describe the strategies that were used to conduct the task. (The validity of using verbal reporting as data [3] in Guided Self-Elicitation is fully discussed in [ 121 and [ 131.) The ultimate objective of Guided Self-Elicitation is to better understand the processes used by the expert in task performance so as to develop a computer-based expert system to assist with similar tasks. The expert begins the Guided Self-Elicitation review of the recordings by analyzing how the stream of incoming perceptions splits into discrete chunks of organized information used in his or her thought processing. The identified chunks are descriptively labeled, analyzed for content, and integrated into an ongoing trace of the process that was used to conduct the task. Fig. 2 shows the interview setup for the elicitation interview. Two video cameras were used to record the analyst's perceptions, one focusing on the elicitation interview subject (the aerospace executive) and one focusing on the notepad used by the decision analyst.
Following completion of the elicitation interview, the two recorded videotapes were merged into a single tape containing a large picture of the elicitation subject, a small insert of the decision analyst's notepad, and an elapsed time code. The sound track from the original tape of the elicitation interview was also inserted into this tape (Fig. 3) .
The decision analyst then reviewed this composite videotape to reconstruct the thought processes he used during the interview. He labeled the identifiable chunks of organized information that he used while leading the elicitation process, and these labels were then overlaid onto the previously constructed composite tape (Fig. 4) .
The research reported in [ 121 used this final videotape as a basis for developing rule conditions and actions in a cognitive information processing system model [4], [IO] to explain the analyst's recorded elicitation activities. In this paper, we present the elicitation interview together with explanatory material which describes the thought process of the analyst as he managed the interview following Merkhofer's [8] elicitation protocol. 
Analyst Label

Iv. ELICITATION SESSION
The following interview transcript was taken from the videotape made using the procedure reviewed in the preceding section. The actual spoken conversation included grammatical mistakes as well as various verbal conversation delimiters ("Ah, heh." "Okay.") which would distract the reader of an unedited written transcript. These have been corrected or removed to create a more meaningful written dialogue. A few proprietary items have been removed or masked. Some long sections have been condensed where these do not aid in understanding the analyst/manager interaction. References in the conversation to the equipment and procedures used to record the elicitation session have also been deleted.
The interview dialogue provides only a partial description of the complex interaction between the analyst and manager. The interaction also includes nonverbal visual and aural cues plus the analyst's interpretation of what is said (or not said) by the manager. The thought process of the analyst, as reconstructed and reported by the analyst himself while reviewing the interview recording, is presented to assist the reader in better understanding how the analyst managed the interview as it progressed. The dialogue has been marked to show the cognitive information "chunks" identified by the analyst to describe external interview cue interpretations (marked Cue:) and his own actions (marked Action:) performed during the interview process. Dialogue corresponding to each Cue or Action immediately follows the label that applies. The dialogue is indented from the discussion of the analyst's thought process as he manages the interview.
Preliminary Discussion: The analyst established a strategy for conducting the interview based on the context within which it was being conducted. The manager was a senior executive with a busy schedule. He had agreed to participate because of his interest in the technical subject area as well as a desire to assist university research that might be relevant to industrial practice. The subject matter of the elicitation was of substantial interest to the executive, but there was no immediate decision to be made based on the results of the elicitation. Merkhofer [8] notes that up to a half day may be required for a probability elicitation, but in this interview less time was available because of the executive's schedule. Furthermore, because the probability elicitation did not address an immediate decision, the analyst had to be continually aware of the need to keep the manager interested in the elicitation.
These issues are also significant in elicitations being conducted to support an immediate decision or risk analysis. Managers and other subjects often have busy schedules, and they frequently have other, more pressing concerns than the analysis. Thus, the issues of available time and manager interest (which are scarcely mentioned in formal elicitation protocols) are frequently near the top of the list of concerns that an analyst must address while conducting an elicitation interview.
In a meeting prior to the interview reported below, the purpose of the elicitation had been already discussed. In addition, the equipment being used had also been discussed, as well as the process of working with the equipment. The analyst starts the interview below with some seemingly idle chitchat which is used to judge the interest level of the manager and to determine the extent to which the recording equipment is likely to intrude into the elicitation process.
ANALYST: Let me start with a little example. One of my colleagues relates a story. He was working with a firm that was thinking of manufacturing some new widget. They made a decision to go ahead and market it, and then they decided, after the fact, to call in the consultants to look at some of the risks associated with this decision to see what could go wrong. So he [the colleague] went around and talked to the chief marketing guy and a few other people and did a little bit of financial analysis. When he came in to give his final report, the CEO of the firm and the chief marketing guy and a few other people were sitting around the table. Summarizing, he said, "The conclusion out of all of this, after working with your marketing people, is that there is a forty percent chance this product will be a success." The CEO leans back in his chair, gasps a little bit, looks over at the chief marketing guy and says, ''I don't understand. You told me it was v e n likely that this would be a success, and now I hear it's a forty percent chance!" The marketing guy says, "Yeah, it's very likely. This is a very competitive market, and a forty percent chance is very likely to be successful. The CEO says, "There's no way I would have approved this thing if I had realized that's what you meant by very likely!" This is a real problem in a lot of business planning. We try to communicate to each other what are the risks associated with different activities. We use terms like "very likely" or "not a very high chance" or "very good chance," and we all have different meanings for those terms. You're an IE [industrial engineer] by background.. . MANAGER: Yes. ANALYST: So you use probabilities as a language for talking about these issues. MANAGER: I've even taught elementary probability courses.
I recognize the problem; we've all faced it.
ANALYST: In many situations-like the marketing case -you don't have very good objective data. You have data that's relevant, but the situation you face is not exactly like the situation where the data was collected. So, if you're going to use probabilities, they are going to come out of somebody's head, and, of course, have the deficiencies and the strengths that such probabilities have. We've found over the years in investigating this that it's not easy to get numbers that really represent properly people's information about uncertainty. The result is that you need somebody who's reasonably well trained to get the numbers from people. From observing the manager, it is evident to the analyst by this point that the manager is either experienced with cameras or does not find them distracting. He is not paying any visible attention to the cameras, nor is he giving any indication of nervousness about his appearance before the cameras. It is also apparent from his reactions that the manager is fully participating in the interview. He is visibly concentrating on what the analyst is saying, and is responding promptly with relevant comments to what the analyst is saying. Based on these favorable indications, the analyst begins the actual elicitation process.
Stage 1: Motivating (Elapsed Interview Time: 0 minutes):
During the motivating stage, the analyst continues to establish rapport with the manager and determines whether there is a significant potential for motivational bias in the elicitation.
ANALYST: We're going to work on the probability distribution for the number of engines that you will ship this year. MANAGER: Right. It has definite pay value for us if we forecast that accurately, and it definitely has uncertainty. ANALYST: I understand that your customers place "supposedly" firm orders. MANAGER: Well stated. "Supposedly" they are firm orders by contract, requesting certain delivery. Yet, in the contract it also has provisions for being able to slide those deliveries out to a certain point in time. When you get into the reality of how the world works, if they don't have the money to pay for the engines, a firm contract doesn't mean too much. You're tied to their needs, and they don't forecast very far out. I should say, they may forecast far out, but it's not very accurate.
The following sequence of questions checks to see if there are reasons that the manager might have a motivational bias. That is, is there a possibility for a conscious or unconscious adjustment in the manager's probabilities because of perceived personal rewards? Action: Check whether there is an oficial forecast. ANALYST: Do you make forecasts of the number of engines that you will ship? Cue: Acknowledges that an official forecast exists, and that the short-term forecast is a goal. MANAGER: Yes. We make two flavors: a five-year forecast that is recognized to have quite a bit of variability in it, and then for next year we make a commitment as to what we will ship. We make that commitment to our [parent] corporation.
So we have what we consider to be a very tight forecast at that point, but yet a year out in our business is still a long way out. This is a lot of lead time for the kind of OEMs [original equipment manufacturers] we deal with. By this point, the analyst is convinced that the manager is fully engaged in the interview. The manager is looking directly at the analyst, and is responding forcefully with relevant answers to the analyst's questions. (This is in contrast to some other experiences of the analyst where the subjects have evidenced confusion at this point in the interview about what this line of questioning has to do with the subject matter of the interview. Such confusion is generally indicated by puzzled expressions or comments that are not directly relevant to the interview.) Hence, the analyst proceeds to address the potentially delicate issue of motivational biases.
Action: Check ,for personal motivational bias. ANALYST: Are things like compensation for people tied to shipping the forecasted number?
The analyst notes that the manager evidences some discomfort at the mention of compensation-perhaps this is going to be a difficult issue to address.
Cue: Acknowledges that personal rewards are tied to the forecast. MANAGER: At the executive level. The working people in the company in general are not on an incentive plan, although we do have a bit of profit sharing and a year-end bonus that goes to everybody. Thus, the manager acknowledges that personal compensation is tied to "making" the numbers shown in the forecasts. Hence, there is a basis for a possible motivational bias.
Action: Begin "debiasing " for personal motivational bias. ANALYST: The reason I raise that is that it's sometimes a problem in this type of assessment. Some people's bonuses are tied to the forecast, so there's hesitation to forecast you'll be below. Cue: Weakly responsive to debiasing. MANAGER: Well, the incentives are very much for making the forecast you put in. That's what I meant by a commitment. From both the vocal tone in which the manager responds and his somewhat stilted body movements and position, the analyst develops some concern that what he had intended as a general comment appears to be striking the manager personally-perhaps as a comment that he (the manager) can't keep his thinking straight in the face of this reward structure. Thus, the analyst proceeds with some caution to check if the manager considers the uncertain quantity to be a goal, rather than an uncertainty. If it is considered to be a goal, then the manager might not be willing to admit to significant uncertainty about its value. This type of "management bias" was reviewed in Section 11.
Action MANAGER: We try and work with them to assure that we get the shipments that we're looking for during the year. We don't have year-end sales, but it's usually in their best interest to take the engines by the end of the year that they signed up for. Otherwise there will a penalty because there is generally price escalation from year to year.
The manager's responses seem to be avoiding the issue of whether motivational biases might impact the forecasts that he makes. At this point, the analyst decides that it is better not to press this issue further. There is a need to proceed so as to not spend excessive time on this issue, and also a need to keep the manager participating fully in the interview. Now the analyst switches to a bias question that reflects less directly on the manager-whether the manager considers the forecasts made by experts to be accurate. If so, the manager might consider the uncertainty to be minimal. This is "expert" bias.
Action: Begin to check for expert bias.
ANALYST: Who actually does these forecasts? Cue: Indicates understanding of expertise needed for forecasting. MANAGER: The forecasts rest with our directors of programs. For the turbofan that we're talking about here, the responsibility rests with the director of turbofan programs. He draws on sales and contracts people, along with people from field sales, and has to balance this with what manufacturing can produce. The lead time for our engines is more than a year, so when you talk about the forecast for a year you already have something in work. Action: Begin debiasing f o r expert bias. ANALYST: Traditionally, how good have these forecasts been? Cue: Indicates problems with experts dealing with uncertainty. MANAGER: There are times that they're really close. There's times that you exceed them like you'd like to, or you exceed them quite a bit and it can be a real strain. You have trouble producing enough for what the market wants. Other times, we don't make the forecasts. That's a real concern. If you forecast more than you are actually able to ship, of course, you create inventory.
It appears that the manager understands that there is uncer-ANALYST: I imagine that with these kinds of items it's very expensive [to create inventory]. . . MANAGER: Oh, yes. The manager's comments leave the analyst with some concern that the manager either does not understand the potential for the various motivations to bias his probability distributions or is not willing to admit that possibility for the record. However, there is little more that can be done to address this point now without appearing to "beat a dead horse" and possibly either lose the interest of the manager or even get him irritated. Thus, the analyst proceeds with the structuring part of the interview. The purposes of the structuring stage are 1) to make sure the quantity of interest is well defined, 2) to determine if this quantity should be disaggregated into multiple different variables before assessment, 3) to find out what assumptions the manager is making during the assessment, and 4) to determine an appropriate measuring scale. While these tasks are being done, the potential for cognitive biases is explored, so these biases can be addressed during the conditioning stage.
Action The discussion of the differences between the models continues at some length. The manager speaks with considerable enthusiasm about this material. It is also important information for deciding exactly how to conduct the probability elicitation. Thus, the analyst continues to encourage the discussion. (Also, the analyst has an engineering background, and this material is interesting to him. Practitioners in operations research and systems analysis note that successful analysts usually get interested in the actual substance of the problems they are analyzing. This helps both in developing a sense in the manager that the analyst is "one of us" and also in avoiding naive mistakes in the models that are built.)
Since there are significant differences between different dash numbers and even between different models, it appears that the uncertain quantity should be disaggregated before the elicitation is conducted. The analyst now works with the manager to determine an appropriate disaggregation. tainty in the quantity of interest. This is a more technical discussion of the clairvoyance test than would be conducted with most managers. However, the manager is actively participating in this discussion. Therefore, the analyst pursues the topic in some detail-both to assure that the variable is well-defined and to keep the interest level of the manager up. Now the analyst investigates whether there are unspoken assumptions that the manager is making about the uncertain quantity.
Action
Action: Probe for assumptions underlying variable probabilily elicitation.
ANALYST: Another question is whether there are any assumptions we ought to make for purposes of doing this elicitation-perhaps about the general economy or any unusual circumstances in your manufacturing capabilities. Cue: Discusses assumptions underlying elicitation. MANAGER: Basically, what's happened with the market in the last ten years is that it peaked out about 1979-80. Everybody was shipping two to three to four times as much as they are today. [Additional discussion of this follows. It is clearly of interest to the manager from both the tone of his voice and the extended nature of his comments.]
We think 1988 was kind of the bottom of the tub, if you will. We see a fair increase for this year, but not a "leaps and bounds" increase. [Some additional discussion of the general industry follows.] The analyst now works to bring some closure to this discussion. As in many interviews, the available time is limited, and there is a need to move on in order to assure that there is enough time available to determine a probability distribution.
Action:
Reinforce basic structuring assumption. ANALYST: So your underlying assumption is that the bottom of the trough has been reached. Cue: Acknowledge the structuring assumptions to be made. MANAGER: There will be general growth [in the overall market] but in the range of two to six percent. ANALYST: Now if we were doing a very detailed model here, we might break out this probability elicitation based on the percent growth for the industry and look at what this means for this specific customer. For the purposes here, we will sort of eyeball that one and go ahead.
Stage 3: Conditioning (Elapsed Interview Time: 15 minutes):
The purpose of the conditioning stage is to bring into the manager's immediate consciousness the relevant knowledge about the uncertain quantity. This helps combat the cognitive biases of anchoringladjustment and availability by helping assure that all relevant information is considered, and not just that which immediately comes to mind.
Action: Describe the general nature of probability elicitation issues.
ANALYST: Let me talk about some of the problems that tend to arise when you do these elicitations. There are two that are by far the biggest problems that you run into. These problems are so reliable that I will routinely, when I teach an introductory class, do a quick and dirty test. And I've never, when I've had ten or fifteen students, not had the effects show up very strongly. They're that strong. Action: Describe overconfidence bias. ANALYST: The first is that people are overconfident about what they know. Their bounds on what they think can happen are too tight. This shows up routinely, time and time again. Now you may say, "What do you mean by too tight; this is a number coming out of my head." But, for example, suppose we came up with a distribution that said there's a ninety-five percent chance the quantity is in suchand-such a range. Suppose you do that ten or fifteen times, and every time the number is outside the range. You would start to get concerned that the person is not representing his true uncertainty in the problems. This effect shows up very strongly, time and time again. It's even got a name, overconfidence, because it shows up so widely. Cue: The [The discussion of cognitive biases continues.] The analyst was concerned about the lack of much reaction from the manager in the early part of Stage 3: Conditioning. The analyst was starting to develop some concern that, as with the motivational biases, the manager seemed to think that these difficulties didn't apply to him or that Ihe manager was losing interest in the entire interview. However, the strong reaction of the manager to the discussion of the availability bias is encouraging, and the analyst moves on the actual encoding of the probability distribution.
Stage 4: Encoding (Elapsed Interview Erne: 21 minutes):
The analyst starts encoding the probability distribution by working first on the extreme fractiles. Research results and practical experience both indicate that determining these before the more central fractiles helps to combat the biases which lead to distributions that are too narrow.
Action: Introduce encoding task.
ANALYST: This is particularly an issue when you have official forecasts, such as you have talked about. So it is something to keep in mind as we go on. In fact, because of this problem, rather than talking about the forecast, we'll talk about how good things could be--maybe "good' is not the right word here-how high things could be, and how low things could be. And what kind of conditions could lead to each of those [results], before we talk about what sort of middle number makes sense. We look at the extremes first because of the fact that people tend to "underthink" about those extremes. So let's do that. You talked about a number of things that affect the number of engines that will be shipped to Customer A. Presumably there's some general business effects-general across the whole economy-that would affect the customer. There are also presumably some general industry-at least to their segment of the aviation industry-type effects. They may have a particular kind of client that tends to buy. There may be effects due to the business of that kind of client. The analyst is starting to work with the manager to identify conditions that could lead to extreme values for the uncertain quantity. By discussing these conditions, they become more available in the manager's thinking, and hence will be judged more likely. This combats overconfidence. Also, working with both the high and low extreme values before considering the central fractiles of the distribution will provide two very different cognitive anchors, which helps to offset the tendency to anchor on a middle value of the uncertain quantity.
Cue: Discusses conditions leading to extreme cases. MANAGER: Very much so. The manufacturers in this segment tend to be relatively small compared to the airplane manufacturers we usually think of. The particular product we're talking about, turbofans, tends to be very responsive to corporate profits as a measure. They're generally used as executive jets and in business aviation. When times are tight and corporate profits are down, people will not typically go out and buy a new turbofan. The economy determines a lot of what their [the airplane manufacturer's] business will be like.
The analyst now introduces a probability wheel [8] as a visual aid to assist with the probability elicitation. Because of the manager's formal probability theory background, he is comfortable with thinking directly in numerical terms about probabilities. As a result, the wheel plays less of a role in the elicitation than with some less technically sophisticated subjects.
ANALYST: I'll bring out my trusty little probability wheel.
The consultants have fancy versions of these.. . MANAGER: I'm familiar with those. ANALYST: [Demonstrating the operation of the probability wheel.] So you know that it adjusts. The fraction of each color adjusts. [The wheel has pink and blue sectors.] The ideas is that this is something that you would spin, and you can pick either pink or blue. Let's say you win with blue. The idea here-and this is really the way in which you define probabilities for this kind of situation-is that if you had to put your own money down, would you rather bet on blue coming up or some quantity out in the world. You're familiar with that? Cue: Indicates understanding of Probability concepts. MANAGER: Right. Action: Describe meaning of 0.99 fractile. ANALYST: Okay. Focusing in on the top number [of possible engine sales], we tend to think of something like a one in a hundred chance. In other words, a number that's high enough so that it's not very likely to be exceeded, but it could happen. If you were to look over a hundred years of data, which you don't have, occasionally something very wild happens and you get very high numbers. Right now, I'm trying to get an upper bound that's a realistic bound on what could happen, although occasionally you might be surprised at that. Again, if you want to think in quantitative terms, you can think of something like a one in a hundred chance, or a one percent probability. [Shows this as a small sliver of blue on the probability wheel.] The familiarity of the manager with probability wheels indicates to the analyst that it is not necessary to give a further explanation of the concept of the 0.99 fractile. The analyst now works to bring to the manager's conscious reasoning the various conditions that could lead to a high value for the uncertain quantity.
Action: Debias against overconjdence and begin to elicit 0.99 fractile.
ANALYST: From what you just said, the kind of situation you'd have that would lead to that [high value] is an economy that's very strong in general; [an economy that] would lead to more corporate customers taking delivery of jets. So, if the economy is good, then shipments would be their highest.
Thinking in terms of the rest of the year, let's try and get a feel for what might be a realistic upper bound, where realistic means, again, as I showed on the wheel, something that could be exceeded, but you probably wouldn't plan on it. Having already spent quite a bit of time on the high end, the analyst decides not to pin down an exact number for the 0.99 fractile at this time because of a concern that the manager might start to anchor on the high number and not provide a realistic low number. This concern is based on the general research findings about anchoring, rather than any particular response of the manager. The analyst now shifts to looking at the low end of the range for the uncertain quantity.
Action: Shift to low end of distribution, and debias with scenarios f o r what could go wrong.
ANALYST: And that's assuming that the economy is going very well and all those other things we talked about. I assume on the low end, then, to focus on that for a minute, that the economy falls apart, or something like that. Are there any catastrophes that are within reason, like this customer goes out of business? Cue: Describes scenarios leading to low values. MANAGER: Well, they come pretty close to that at times. We've literally had engines-again, this is a product with an eighteen-month to two-year lead time-in shipping, ready to go to the customer, and then be stopped from shipping them because of credit problems. So it's not as speculative as you might thing for that kind of product. Yeah, if you assumed a real disaster. Another stock market Black Monday, and everything really clamped up.. . Action: Reinforce possibility of low result. ANALYST: Which is certainly, I would say, within a one in a hundred chance. Cue: Concurs with realism of bad scenarios.
MANAGER: I would.. .
ANALYST:
What do you think of that? MANAGER: I would say you could end up essentially shutting them down. We've shipped eight engines. We're two months underway. So you can't get below eight. They've taken title to those, and there's probably some going in March. So the lower bound would be somewhere in the lows teens probably.
ANALYST: So maybe ten to . . . ANALYST: Well, that's a pretty impressive range. The research literature indicates that almost everyone underestimates the amount of uncertainty in the forecasts they make. In light of this, it was probably a mistake for the analyst to make this comment about the breadth of the range. As the discussion presented below at the very end of the interview shows, the comments by the analyst may have triggered some second thoughts by the manager about the breadth of the range from the 0.01 to the 0.99 fractiles.
Cue: ConJrms range.
MANAGER: Yes. And we've seen both extremes. We've had times where the shipments dropped by seventy to eighty percent within a three-month time period.
ANALYST: Is that right! MANAGER: At other times-Back in the late Seventies, anything we could make they would take. Just strictly a capacity limitation on what we could produce. ANALYST: I don't think this is consumer products. MANAGER: No, that's true! Actually, you can get variations like this in consumer product sales. This discussion is mostly idle chitchat by the analyst to show interest in the subject matter, and the manager appears to accept it as such since he does not make any further comments. The analyst now shifts to working on the center of the probability distribution for the uncertain quantity. He starts by specifying values for the quantity and asking for probabilities.
Action: Begin assessing the middle of the probability range. ANALYST: These are extremes. Let's look a little bit at more realistic numbers. Realistic is not the right word, because I certainly think these are realistic. Having gotten an initial value for the 0.25 fractile, the analyst now shifts to the upper part of the probability distribution, rather than spend more time getting a definite number for the 0.25 fractile. The interview is now starting to get long, and the analyst is concerned that he will run out of time. The manager does not appear to be losing interest, but the interview is now approaching the time limit that had been indicated when it was set up. The analyst is concemed that the manager may have other commitments, or that the video equipment might be scheduled for other use.
Action The analyst acquiesces to the manager's statement about needing an even number, although there isn't really anything wrong with the median being odd. If the median were fortyfive, then this would mean there was a fifty percent chance that the uncertain quantity would be forty-six or higher and a fifty percent chance that it would be forty-four or lower. During the entire preceding section while the probability elicitation was going on, the manager has appeared to be intensely concentrating. The analyst interpreted this as indicating that these questions were both difficult and interesting for him.
Action: [This approximately agrees with the manager's earlier statement that the probability of shipping fifty or more engines is twenty-five to thirty percent.] The verification continues with a graphical aid. First, the 0.01 and 0.99 fractiles are more exactly specified. The manager still appears to be paying close attention to the interview. as you pointed out, we want to get this so that fifty percent of the time you're going to be inside and fifty percent you're going to be out. MANAGER: That's why I adjusted it. That's probably closer. The inconsistency has been resolved. Now, the analyst confirms that the probabilities of being below the 0.25 fractile and above the 0.75 fractile are the same.
ANALYST: Going back and looking at this, do you think you're still about equally likely to be in this range [pointing to range above the upper quartile of fifty-two] or below that [pointing to range below the lower quartile of thirty-two]? MANAGER: Yes. The manager understands probability theory. Thus, it is appropriate to use probability terminology in some final consistency checks. The analyst now plots the cumulative probability distribution, and then uses this to determine an approximate probability density function to use in a further consistency check.
Action: Plot curve as another consistency check. ANALYST: Okay, you know some probability-in fact, you have taught it. Let's do a quickie plot of the cumulative distribution for this data. [The analyst draws the axes for a cumulative probability distribution, and labels the n a x i s at intervals of ten and the y-axis at intervals of 0.25. He flat for a while, and then drops off pretty fast. I interpret this as saying there's really quite a bit of uncertainty. There's a fairly even probability of it being anywhere over a fairly broad range.
Cue: Confirms distribution.
MANAGER: That's what it would reflect. It's probably a little tighter than that. This comment shows that the manager is starting to be concerned that his probability distribution is too wide. The analyst begins to debias for overconfidence.
Action: Re- 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The elicitation session presented above is typical of those seen in decision analysis practice, with the exception that the manager was more sophisticated about probability concepts than is often true. For example, he recognized inconsistencies in his responses in cases where that might not be true for managers with less knowledge of probability. Because of this, it was easier than is sometimes the case to resolve inconsistencies in responses.
The interview transcript and annotations presented above show that the analyst must continually balance the desire for a probability distribution that more accurately represents the manager's knowledge against the need to retain the interest and attention of the manager, as well as the need to complete the elicitation in a time-efficient manner. This can require compromises in the process relative to the formal probability elicitation protocols that are specified in the literature.
Finally, this case study shows that the Guided SelfElicitation process helps an expert to better understand the reasoning process that he or she uses. The videotape recordings contained sufficient aural and visual information for the decision analyst to reconstruct his reasoning, and he also gained additional insight into practices that he has used for many years in probability elicitations. 
